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Who Benefits from Repealing Tampon
Taxes? Empirical Evidence from
New Jersey
Christopher Cotropia, and Kyle Rozema*

Many state and local governments exclude some medical products from the sales tax base,
including some that are primarily used by men such as hair growth products. However,
tampons and other menstrual hygiene products are subject to sales taxes in most states. A
recent social movement advocates for the repeal of these “tampon taxes” and several class
action lawsuits have been filed against states citing equal protection violations. In this article, we use the 2005 elimination of menstrual hygiene products from the sales tax base in
New Jersey as a natural experiment to study who benefits from the repeal of tampon taxes.
We find that the tax break is fully shifted to consumers, but that the tax break is not distributed equally. Low-income consumers enjoy a benefit from the repeal of the tax by
more than the size of the repealed tax. For high-income consumers, the tax break is
shared equally with producers. The results suggest that repealing tampon taxes removes
an unequal tax burden and could make menstrual hygiene products more accessible for
low-income consumers.

I. INTRODUCTION
On March 3, 2016, actress Margo Seibert and others filed a class action lawsuit against
the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance to “eliminate the ‘Tampon Tax’
imposed … on women in New York State” on the grounds that it violates the Equal Protection Clause.1 The “tampon tax” referenced in the lawsuit refers to the inclusion of

*Direct correspondence to Kyle Rozema; email: kylerozema@uchicago.edu. Cotropia is Professor of Law and Austin Owen Research Fellow, University of Richmond School of Law; Rozema is Wachtell Lipton Fellow, University of
Chicago Law School; email: kylerozema@uchicago.edu, website: www.kylerozema.com.
For helpful comments, we are grateful to Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Daniel Hemel, Don Kenkel, Doug Miller, Adam
Picker, Eleanor Wilking, and seminar participants at Midwestern Law and Economics Conference and University
of Richmond School of Law Colloquy series.
1
See Compl., Siebert v. N.Y. St. Dep’t of Tax. & Finance, No. 151800/2016 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 3, 2016). The lawsuit
frames the tampon tax as a tax on “women.” The authors understand that there are individuals who do not identify
as a “woman” or “female” and menstruate. Furthermore, there are those who may identify as a “man” or “male”
and menstruate. We will mostly use the term consumer to identify those purchasing menstrual hygiene products,
but at times use the language “female” and “woman” because that is used in the relevant lawsuits and most academic and popular press discussions surrounding recent efforts to eliminate tampon taxes.
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menstrual hygiene products, such as tampons and sanitary pads,2 in the sales tax base.3
Given that almost all menstruating women essentially must use menstrual hygiene products in today’s society, the main argument is that the tax is akin to imposing a tax on
women.4 The lawsuit notes that many medical products used primarily by men, including
Rogaine, are not subject to sales taxes. The lawsuit is an illustration of a movement to
exclude menstrual hygiene products from sales taxes.5 In 2017, 15 states introduced legislation targeting the tampon tax.6 If passed, these states would join 13 other states and the
District of Columbia that do not tax menstrual hygiene products.
The emphasis on women bearing the burden of tampon taxes is a crucial point for
the movement. To our knowledge, however, no empirical evidence has documented the
extent that the tax break from repealing tampon taxes is shifted to consumers. The empirical
question of who bears the burden of tampon taxes is important because tax laws only dictate
how much a tax is and who remits the tax, but who bears the burden of a tax is not necessarily who remits the tax. Social scientists distinguish the legal incidence of the tax (how much
a tax is and who remits the tax) from the economic incidence of the tax (who bears the burden of the tax), and emphasize that the behavior of buyers and sellers in markets—not
laws—determines who bears the burden of the tax (the economic incidence). To see the distinction, consider the following example. Suppose that Margo Seibert purchases a menstrual
hygiene product with a retail price of $5.00 and the product is subject to a 5 percent sales
tax. The after-tax price of the product is $5.25, and the store collects the $0.25 tax and remits
the collected tax to the government. Does this mean that Margo would be better off by $0.25
if there was no sales tax on the menstrual hygiene product?
Not necessarily. To see why, we must assess what happens to consumer prices in the
counterfactual world in which menstrual hygiene products are no longer taxed. Now suppose that a law is passed that excludes menstrual hygiene products from the sales tax
base, and that the retail price of the product Margo purchased increases from $5.00 to
$5.25. Because retail price fully adjusted after the product was not subject to the tax,
Margo enjoyed no benefit from the tax repeal: Margo paid $5.25 for the same product

2
We will collectively refer to these products as menstrual hygiene for menstrual hygiene products. Menstrual
hygiene products are also commonly referred to as feminine hygiene products. Some have argued that the use of
the term “feminine” when describing these products needs to be stopped because of the implicit information it
conveys about the user of the products and because it “perpetuates the fear of body parts and fluids”
(Licorish 2017).
3
Unlike excise taxes that are specific to some goods like alcohol and cigarettes, this tampon tax instead refers to
the application of the general state sales tax to menstrual hygiene products.
4
The tampon tax in New York, the complaint argues, “denies women equal protection and discriminates against
women, because a tax on [menstrual hygiene] products is on its face a tax on women, and because it results in the
disparate treatment of women.” “A tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews.” quoting Bray v. Alexandria Women’s
Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
5

Jennifer Weiss-Wolf of the Brennan Justice Center at New York University School of Law identifies this movement
as part of the “mainstream policy agenda” promoting “[m]enstural equality” (Weiss-Wolf 2016).
6

See the Appendix for more details.
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regardless of whether the product was included in the sales tax base. Instead, the tax benefit was entirely enjoyed by individuals on the supply side of the market, including those
individuals involved in producing and selling menstrual hygiene products.
In this article, we estimate the economic incidence of the 2005 elimination of menstrual hygiene products from the sales tax base in New Jersey. To do so, we use data on
over 16,000 purchases of menstrual hygiene products in New Jersey and surrounding
states between 2004 and 2006 from Nielsen Consumer Panel Data.
To what extent do we expect consumers to enjoy the tax benefit of the tampon tax
repeal? In general, the side of the market that is less able to respond to taxes should bear
more of the tax burden (Fullerton & Metcalf 2002). Here, the need to use menstrual
hygiene products is driven by nature: women cannot decide whether to menstruate.7 The
only major response for menstruating women to avoid the tampon tax burden is to not
use menstrual hygiene products, which is unlikely to be a realistic option in today’s society. One would therefore predict consumers to bear most of the tax burden, implying
that the benefit of eliminating tampon taxes would be enjoyed by consumers. We find
evidence consistent with this prediction: relative to consumer prices in control states on
the East Coast, consumer prices in New Jersey decreased by 7.3 percent after the repeal
of the 6.9 percent sales tax on menstrual hygiene products. The results suggest that the
tax break was fully enjoyed by consumers.
The movement to repeal tampon taxes often articulates a second motivation for
eliminating tampon taxes: to make menstrual hygiene products more affordable, particularly for low-income women (Garcia 2017). There are reports that some women have difficulty affording menstrual hygiene products (Weiss-Wolf & Burns 2016), with some using
alternative, less expensive products that pose higher health risks (e.g., Roberts 2017).
Thus, we next investigate the distributional consequences of tampons taxes by estimating
how the tax break is distributed across consumers by income. For high-income consumers, we find that the benefit of repealing the tampon tax is roughly shared with producers (consumer prices in New Jersey decreased by 3.9 percent relative to prices in the
control states). In contrast, we find that prices for low-income consumers decrease by
more than the size of the tax (by 12.4 percent relative to prices in the control states).8 In
other words, the tax benefit is undershifted to prices of menstrual hygiene products purchased by high-income consumers at a rate of 0.57 and overshifted to prices of menstrual
hygiene products purchased by low-income consumers at a rate of 1.8.9 These findings
suggest that repealing tampon taxes will promote the affordability of menstrual hygiene
products to low-income consumers.

7

Women can engage in menstruation suppression, which poses health risks (Hillard 2014:631).

8
Differential shifting of taxes to prices by consumer attributes like income has been found in previous studies,
including for cigarette taxes (e.g., Harding et al. 2012).
9
Overshifting has been found for other consumptions taxes, including sales taxes more generally (e.g., Besley &
Rosen 1999), cigarette taxes (e.g., Keeler et. al. 1996; Delipalla & O’Donnell 2001; Hanson & Sullivan 2009), and
alcohol taxes (Young & Bielinska-Kwapisz 2002; Kenkel 2005).
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An ideal tax incidence analysis characterizes the effect of a tax change on the utility
levels of consumers, which incorporates the change in prices but also any opportunity
cost to achieve the prices actually paid. If, for example, the opportunity costs associated
with consumer price search increased after the tax repeal, the tax pass through results
would overstate the true benefits obtained by consumers. One potentially important
opportunity cost is that associated with coupon use. In the sample, 22 percent of all menstrual hygiene purchases used a coupon. We investigate whether the tax pass through
results adequately capture the consumer benefit by estimating the extent that New Jersey
consumers respond to the tax repeal by changing their use of coupons when purchasing
menstrual hygiene products. We find that coupon use for high-income consumers in
New Jersey decreased by 4 percent of menstrual hygiene purchases following the tax
repeal and coupon use for low-income consumers in New Jersey increased by 5 percent
of menstrual hygiene purchases following the tax repeal. The differential changes in coupon use by income provides some evidence that the tax pass through results overstate the
true differences in benefits from the tax repeal between these groups.
In a final step, we explore two mechanisms that could be driving the differential
tax incidence results. First, we investigate differential between-product pass through.
Taxes could be passed through to prices differently by product, and consumers do not all
purchase the same products. Second, we investigate differential within-product pass
through. Even for the low-income and high-income consumers purchasing the same
menstrual hygiene product, there is not a single price for a given product across the market and between consumers within a market. For example, prices for a given product differ between stores, and different consumers shop at different stores. As a result, taxes
could be passed through to prices at different rates even within a product. We find no
evidence that the differential pass through by income is explained by differential
between-product pass through, but find evidence it is partly explained by differential
within-product pass through.
The findings build on the legal research documenting how actual or potential
changes in tax laws affect distributional outcomes (e.g., Griffith 1989; Kaplow 1994;
Kamin 2008; Hayashi 2014; Schizer 2015; Stolper 2016; Hemel & Rozema forthcoming).10
More generally, it builds on legal research documenting how laws affect distributional
outcomes, including, for instance, recent work on the distributional consequences of deficit reduction (Doran 2008), federal sentencing guidelines (Fischman & Schanzenbach
2012), legislative attempts to make the courts more accessible (Niblett & Yoon 2017),
and the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence (Hemel forthcoming). The results
provide policy-relevant information to state policymakers considering repealing tampon
taxes.
This article proceeds in four sections. Section II offers an overview of tampon taxes
and the debate it has engendered. Section III first describes the data and identification

10

A related economics literature investigates the distributional effects of taxes, including consumption taxes
(e.g., Rubenstein & Scafidi 2002; Bento et al. 2009).
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strategy and then reports the results. Section IV explores the mechanisms for the tax pass
through results. Section V concludes.

II. BACKGROUND
A recent social movement has made some strides to change sales tax laws regarding menstrual hygiene products in the United States and in other countries,11 but a majority of
states in the United States still tax them. A sales tax is a rate that is applied to goods at
the point of sale. Five states have no sales taxes. In the 45 states with sales taxes, only five
states exempted menstrual hygiene products from the sales tax base before the recent
tampon tax movement.12 One example of an earlier repeal of the tampon tax is New Jersey’s passage of an exemption in 2005. In 2005, New Jersey had a state-wide sales tax of
6.9 percent.13 On October 1, 2005, New Jersey’s Streamlined Sales and Use Tax legislation went into effect,14 which included the exemption of “tampons or like products” from
the sales tax. Recently, four states and the District of Columbia have passed exemptions.
However, not all recent efforts to eliminate the tampon tax have been successful (Dillion
2016). As of this writing, a number of states are currently considering legislation to repeal
the tax. See the Appendix for more details.
A. Reasons Offered for Repealing Tampon Tax
1. Equality
The main argument made against taxing menstrual hygiene products is that it is unfair
and inequitable because they are necessities in today’s society (e.g., Crawford & Spivack
2017). The theory of not taxing necessities has supported sales tax exemptions for other
products in some jurisdictions, including food and medications (e.g., CRH Catering
Co. v. Commonwealth).15 Proponents argue that access to proper menstrual hygiene products is crucial to women’s health, in part because lack of proper menstrual hygiene is
linked to many types of infections (Sumpter & Torondel 2013; House et al. 2013; Sommer et al. 2015). The American Medical Association has even advocated for exempting
menstrual hygiene products from sales taxes because “menstrual hygiene products are
essential for women’s health” (AMA 2016). The Illinois Supreme Court in Geary

11

Canada recently repealed its tampon taxes (Watters 2015), and there are recent proposals to repeal tampon taxes
in the United Kingdom and Australia (Chadwick 2015).

12

The Appendix provides a detailed account of state sales taxes and state proposals to repeal tampon taxes.

13

ST-75, Sales Tax Collection Schedule, available at http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/taxation/pdf/other_forms/
sales/st75.pdf.

14

P.L. 2005, c. 126, codified as N.J.S.A. 54:32B-8.1.

15

521 A.2d 497, 500 (1987).
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v. Dominick’s Finer Foods held that menstrual hygiene products “are necessities of life” for
menstruating women.16
Proponents of tampon tax repeal also argue that the taxes are particularly inequitable given that they target an immutable characteristic of roughly half the population at
some point in their life (Gass-Poore 2016). Proponents of repealing tampon taxes assert
that the taxes uniquely target those who menstruate, meaning, in practice, the taxes have
a discriminatory effect resulting in unequal treatment under the law (Myers 2016; Ooi
forthcoming). The argument is that the tampon tax is, accordingly, a de facto tax on
being a woman (Crawford & Spivack 2017). This inequality becomes even more apparent,
proponents argue, considering the fact that many products that are used to treat maleoriented17 conditions are exempt from sales taxes. Many male-oriented products are
deemed medical, and many jurisdictions exempt medical products from sales taxes
(Due & Mikesell 1983). Proponents of repealing tampon taxes further argue that these
male-oriented products are not directed at conditions that must be remedied to participate in society (Garcia 2017). Thus, the argument goes, not only do most jurisdictions
tax a necessary product for women, many exempt products that addresses elective medical concerns of men.
This inequality argument is the basis for equal protection challenges to sales taxes
on menstrual hygiene products, including the lawsuit against New York discussed in
Section I.18 A similar argument is being made in the Florida class action suit Wendell v. Fl.
Dep’t of Revenue.19 The plaintiffs argue that “[t]he State Defendants’ decision to tax [menstrual hygiene products], used exclusively by women, but not tax other common household remedies also used by men, is irrational and discriminatory.”20

2. Affordability
The other main argument made in favor of repealing tampon taxes is that it would
increase the affordability (and thus accessibility) of menstrual hygiene products by lowering consumer prices (e.g., Weiss-Wolf 2015). Most proponents are particularly concerned

16

544 NE.2d 344, 346 (Ill. 1989). The Illinois Supreme Court ultimately found that the Chicago City Council
intended to exempt “tampons and sanitary napkins,” and thus the collection of such taxes by the state was
improper.

17

Such products include those to help treat erectile dysfunction and hair loss, products that address mainly maleoriented conditions. And, again, just as with our use of the term female, we will use the term male to identify those
who biologically do not (or have or will not) menstruate even though they may not themselves identify as “male.”

18

See Compl., Siebert v. N.Y. St. Dep’t of Tax. & Finance, No. 151800/2016 (Mar. 3, 2016).

19

Compl., Wendell v. Fl. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 43590417 (July 6, 2016). A similar suit was filed in Ohio. See
Compl., Rowitz v. Ohio Dep’t of Taxation, 2016-00197 (Ohio Ct. Claims, filed Mar. 14, 2016), dismissed without
prejudice. Refiled as Rowitz v. State of Ohio et al., 2016-CV-003518 (Franklin Co. Ct. Common Pleas, filed Apr.
11, 2016).

20

Compl., Wendell v. Fl. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 43590417 (Fl. Ct. July 6, 2016).
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with increasing access for low-income women (e.g., Weiss-Wolf 2016). Women spend, on
average, $7 per month on menstrual hygiene products (BBC 2016). Given the average
state and local sales tax in the United States of 6.25 percent, this means that the government collects $5.25 in sales taxes per year from the average menstruating woman (BBC
2016). Proponents of repealing tampon taxes argue that low-income women have a difficult time affording menstrual hygiene products (e.g., Garcia 2017), partly because most
noncash public assistance programs like the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
do not cover menstrual hygiene products (USDA 2017). Some proponents argue that, as
a result, some women use less sanitary alternatives or use menstrual hygiene products in
unsanitary ways (a debated fact) (e.g., Roberts 2017). Proponents argue that restricted
access to menstrual hygiene products can be particularly harmful for low-income women
because it can make completing daily tasks like going to work or school difficult
(e.g., Hennegan & Montgomery 2016).
B. Reasons Offered for Keeping Tampon Taxes
1. State Budgets and Tax Rates
Some opponents of repealing tampon taxes justify their opposition on revenue grounds
(e.g., Kaeding 2017). Estimates suggest that the Commonwealth of Virginia would lose roughly
$5 million per year in tax revenue if menstrual hygiene products were to be excluded from
the sales tax base (VA Department of Taxation 2016), and estimates suggest that the State of
California has annually raised over $20 million in revenues from menstrual hygiene product
sales (CA Senate Committee 2016). In 2016, the California governor is said to have vetoed a
tampon tax exemption specifically because of budgetary concerns (Dillon 2016).
Opponents point out several underlying motivations for not wanting to exclude menstrual hygiene products from the sales tax base. First, opponents argue that the revenue
raised is used to fund important public policies (Kaeding 2017). Second, opponents argue
that repealing tampon taxes, like repealing or decreasing any taxes, decreases government
revenue that must then be raised by other means, such as by increasing the overall sales
tax rate (Kaeding 2017). Recent evidence suggests that the rate of sales taxes increases by
between 0.10 and 0.25 percentage points for each additional sales tax exemption
(Stratmann 2017). Third, opponents point out that repealing the tampon tax is a slippery
slope and would create difficult line-drawing problems for excluding other products from
the sales tax base, particularly those deemed necessary (Ooi forthcoming). Fourth, opponents argue that excluding menstrual hygiene products from the sales tax base would
increase the costs of administering the sales tax (for a general discussion of the costs of
administering the sales tax, see Slemrod & Bakija 2008).
2. Economically Efficient Taxes
A tax that does not change behavior is said to be economically efficient. Economists typically promote taxes that distort behavior the least (e.g., Gruber 2013). To see why, imagine a world without taxes where consumers are rational. Because consumers make
decisions that are optimal (maximizing their own happiness), social welfare, given that
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allocation of goods, is maximized. Now suppose the government needs to raise revenue
through consumption taxes and must decide what goods to tax (known as Ramsey optimal taxation) (Ramsey 1927). Given that consumer decisions before any tax is imposed
maximized social welfare, any tax that changes those decisions necessarily decreases social
welfare. Therefore, government should choose to tax goods that lead to the lowest distortions. This simple scenario explains why economists typically advocate taxing goods for
which consumers do not highly adjust quantity demanded when prices change (the most
inelastically demanded goods).
Above, we discussed how menstrual hygiene products are essentially a necessity for
menstruating women in today’s society, implying that the demand for menstrual hygiene
products is likely to be highly inelastic. Therefore, from an economic efficiency standpoint, menstrual hygiene products would be a good product to tax.
3. Superior Alternatives
Some opponents argue that repealing tampon taxes is not the best means for helping
women who cannot afford menstrual hygiene products because the taxes only represent
a small portion of the price (although this assumes that consumers bear the full burden
of the tax) (Cauterucci 2016). Therefore, some opponents argue that repealing tampon
taxes will not necessarily make menstrual hygiene products much more affordable
because a reduction in consumer prices by the amount of sales taxes (usually 4–10 percent) will only make a marginal difference in the affordability of menstrual hygiene products. Instead, these opponents argue, only policies that cover a substantial proportion of
the cost of menstrual hygiene products will make a meaningful difference in the affordability of menstrual hygiene products (Rampell 2016). Such alternative proposals include
direct subsidies, allowing food stamps or Medicaid to be used to purchase menstrual
hygiene products, and enacting tax credits for menstrual hygiene product purchases (for
a review of the proposals, see Ooi forthcoming:13.). Opponents argue that because
repealing tampon taxes will exhaust the political capital necessary to achieve better policies that promote the affordability of menstrual hygiene products to those that need the
most help, tampon taxes should not be eliminated.
4. Distributional Consequences
The above affordability argument in favor of eliminating tampon taxes is directed at lowincome individuals. If the only goal of repealing tampon taxes is to increase the affordability of menstrual hygiene products to low-income individuals, however, some opponents argue that repealing tampon taxes will have the unintended effect of reducing
consumer prices for high-income women as well. In a Washington Post opinion column,
Catherine Rampell pointed out that eliminating tampon taxes is “poorly targeted” at
helping low-income women afford menstrual hygiene products, particularly because it
also gives “a break to billionaires” (Rampell 2016). These distributional consequences of
repealing tampon taxes are another reason advocated for adopting alternative policies
that provide direct subsidies for menstrual hygiene products to low-income women
(Eckl & Perez 2005:351).
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III. THE INCIDENCE OF TAMPON TAXES
Our discussion of tampon taxes so far has been about fairness, affordability, and the
movement to repeal them. We are able to find no empirical evidence documenting the
economic incidence of tampon taxes. In this part, we provide such a tax incidence analysis of tampon taxes exploiting as a natural experiment the 2005 New Jersey law that
exempted menstrual hygiene products from the sales tax base.
A. Research Design
Following a standard framework in the tax incidence literature, we use a differences-indifferences (DD) approach to estimate the economic incidence of tampon taxes in New
Jersey. The approach uses the prices paid by consumers in other states as a control group.
We restrict the control groups to states in close proximity to New Jersey because prices in
these states serve as a better control group than prices in states throughout the country.
This is because, for instance, there could be different supply-side shocks that could influence prices across some parts of the country but not near New Jersey (Angrist & Pischke
2009). The control states we use are Delaware, Connecticut, Maryland, and
Pennsylvania,21 but the results are consistent when we use an expanded definition of control states as well as using all states as control states.
On October 1, 2005, prices in New Jersey are “treated” with the new tax law repealing tampon taxes while prices in the control states are not.22 The DD approach compares
the average change in prices in New Jersey to the average change in prices from purchases made in the control states, after adjusting for differences in prices between states,
over time, and by other covariates described below. The identifying assumption is that
absent any change in the law in New Jersey, the trend in prices in the control states is
what we should have expected to see in New Jersey.23 Equation (1) sets out the DD
specification:24
lnðPinst Þ = α + α Postt + λ Treats + β Postt × Treats + γ Xi + δt + μs + ζu + εust

ð1Þ

21

Note that New York changed sales taxes on June 1, 2005 (from 4.25 percent to 4 percent), so we do not use the
state as a control group.

22

As of the time of this analysis, Nielsen data were unavailable for other tampon tax repeals.

23

There is a concern that New Jersey households who previously purchased menstrual hygiene products in a different state because of the New Jersey sales tax on menstrual hygiene products respond to tax repeal by purchasing
menstrual hygiene products in New Jersey. Intuitively, one would be concerned about changes in cross-border
shopping if the costs of traveling to another state to purchase tampons are less than the tax savings. In the Appendix, we investigate cross-border shopping and find no evidence that cross-border shopping biases the results.

24

The literature uses various specifications that are slightly different but essentially arrive at the same result. This
specification follows the standard DD step up and is used in some tax incidence analyses (e.g., Cawley & Frisvold 2017).
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for product u purchased by household i in state s in year-month t, where Piust denotes the
consumer price. The dependent variable is the natural log of prices, which gives us a percent change interpretation and is a standard approach in the incidence literature on
sales taxes (e.g., Poterba 1996; Besley & Rosen 1999).
The coefficient of interest is the DD estimator β, which is the coefficient on the
interaction term Postt × Treats. The variable Postt × Treats equals 1 if the product was
purchased in New Jersey after the tampon tax was repealed, and is otherwise 0. The
dummy variable Postt equals 1 if the product was purchased after New Jersey tampon
taxes were repealed, and is otherwise 0. The dummy variable Treats equals 1 if the product was purchased in New Jersey, and is otherwise 0.25
In Equation (1), we employ a standard set of control variables (see, e.g., Harding
et al. 2012). First, we control for systematic changes in prices from month to month using
year-month fixed effects, δt. Second, we control for systematic differences in prices
between each state using state fixed effects, μs. Third, we control for household demographics, Xi, including household size, education, marital status, income, and race.
Finally, we control for systematic differences in prices between each and every product
using product fixed effects, ζu, which is discussed in more detail below.
The estimated coefficient β indicates the average percent change in prices in New
Jersey after the products were no longer included in the sales tax base. The New Jersey
sales tax was 6.9 percent before the tampon tax repeal. A point estimate of −0.069
would therefore indicate that the tax beneﬁt was fully shifted to prices, implying that consumers obtain the full beneﬁt of the tax repeal. A coefﬁcient of 0 would indicate that prices
fully adjusted after the law, implying that consumers obtain none of the beneﬁt of the tax
law (producers obtain the full beneﬁt). A point estimate between 0 and −0.069 would indicate the tax beneﬁt was undershifted to consumer prices, implying that consumers and producers share the beneﬁt of the tax repeal. For instance, consumers and producers would
share the beneﬁt equally if the estimated coefﬁcient was −0.034 (half of the sales tax rate
of 0.069). A point estimate less than −0.069 would indicate that the tax beneﬁt was overshifted to prices, implying that consumers beneﬁt from the tax repeal an amount more
than tax.
There is an important issue relating to the estimation of standard errors. The socalled clustering problem here addresses the fact that prices within a state tend to be correlated because they face similar market and other influences (Donald & Lang 2007;
Angrist & Pischke 2009; Cameron & Miller 2015). In the context of one treatment state
and multiple control states, a standard approach in the reduced form literature more
generally is to cluster standard errors by state because that is the level of treatment assignment (e.g., Paik et al. 2012:203). We follow this common approach and report standard
errors clustered by state. However, we acknowledge the problem here that we have only
one treatment group so state-level clustering causes “‘overfitting’ with estimated residuals

25
Note that the main effect for Treats is actually included in the state fixed effects, but we include it in the expression for Equation (1) for completeness.
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Figure 1: Distribution of retail prices paid.

systematically too close to zero compared to the true error terms” (Cameron & Miller
2015:341).
Cameron and Miller (2015) discuss the issue of few treated groups and suggests a
test to be ran to assess the concerns with few treatment groups. We implement the test in
Baker et al. (2008) that follows the guidance of Anderson and Meyer (2000), Conley and
Taber (2011), and Gruber and Hungerman (2008). The test asks whether the changes in
prices in New Jersey from before to after the tax change could fit within the distribution
of the changes in prices witnessed by the control states in different periods. Intuitively,
the test estimates the DD coefficient after randomly assigning treatments to the control
states in different time periods. As in Baker et al. (2008), we run 10,000 placebo DD
regressions. The test provides strong evidence that the estimated decrease in prices
reported in the next section would not have happened by chance: the 99 percent confidence interval [0.000053, −0.000096], as we will see, does not come close to the decrease in
prices observed in New Jersey after the tax repeal.
Although pointing to related recent literature that faces similar standard error concerns does not alleviate the clustering concern here, we note that recent published work
faced similar settings: Cawley and Frisvold (2017) had two clusters; Harju et al. (2016)
had three clusters; Berardi et al. (2012) had two clusters; Bergman and Hansen (2010)
had two clusters; Grogger (2015) had two clusters; and Kenkel (2005) had only one
cluster.
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B. Data
We use data from the Nielsen Consumer Panel Data (Nielsen) from 2004 to 2006. Nielsen contains information about purchases of roughly 50,000 U.S. households. Households “continually provide information to Nielsen about their households, what products
they buy, as well as when and where they make purchases” (Consumer Panel Dataset
Manual 2016). The participating households “use in-home scanners to record all of their
purchases, from any outlet, intended for personal, in-home use” (Consumer Panel Dataset Manual 2016). Nielsen is demographically balanced such that it represents the
demography of the United States.26 Households come from all states and all major markets. Nielsen contains demographic information for each household and some information for each household member, including state of residence, household size, and
household income. For each head of the household, Nielsen contains information on
age, race, education, and marital status.
Nielsen contains information about each purchase made by participating households. This includes the date of purchase and “detailed transaction information about
each product purchased,” including the Universal Product Code (UPC), the number of
units in the UPC (e.g., a box of 10 tampons), quantity of the purchase (e.g., purchased
two boxes of the product), the retail price, whether the product was on special, and any
coupons used (and the amount of the coupon). We use the price per quantity purchased
as the retail price, which reflects the price of a single purchase of a given UPC (where different UPCs can contain different number of units). We adjust retail prices by coupons
(following Nielsen’s data documentation) and apply the applicable state sales tax rate
from Tax Policy Center (2017) to capture the actual price paid by consumers (herein
“consumer prices”). We also adjust prices by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) (to 2006
dollars). Throughout, we use consumer prices as the outcome (prices actually paid by
consumers, which includes the sales tax).
Nielsen provides detailed product attributes for each UPC. In total, there are
roughly 1.5 million UPCs. Nielsen groups products by UPC into different product hierarchies. There are 10 “Departments” (e.g., Health and Beauty Care), roughly 125 “Product
Groups” (e.g., Sanitary Protection), and roughly 1,100 “Product Modules” (e.g., sanitary
napkins, tampons). The New Jersey law does not exclude all menstrual hygiene products
from the sales tax base, including “douches, wipes and sprays (unless containing an active
ingredient or a Drug Facts box).”27 Using the detailed information in product descriptions, we restrict the analysis to the relevant menstrual hygiene products that were subject
to the sales tax before the law went into effect but not after the law (menstrual hygiene
products in the product modules of sanitary napkins and tampons). This includes
634 unique UPCs.

26

We use the provided sampling weights. The panel composition is also designed to be projectable to some Scantrack markets.

27

P.L. 2005, c. 126, codified as N.J.S.A. 54:32B-8.1.
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Descriptive Statistics

Sample
Entire sample
New Jersey
Control states
Sample by Income Group
High income
Low income
Sample by Education
College graduate
Not college graduate

Sample Size

Consumer Prices
(Mean $)

Household Income

# Households

# Purchases

3.61
3.45
3.66

59k
61k
58k

2,133
510
1,623

16,170
3,612
12,558

3.89
3.2

80k
28k

1,361
772

10,527
5,643

3.85
3.45

76k
48k

1,080
1,053

7,944
8,226

NOTE: Data from Nielsen Consumer Panel, 2004 to 2006. Mean consumer prices include relevant state sales taxes.
Consumer prices and household income are adjusted to 2006 prices by the Consumer Price Index. Price differences by state, income, and education reflect both differences in product quality and differences in prices for the
same product.

C. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. The sample consists of 510 households in New Jersey and 1,623 households in the control states. In New Jersey and the control states, there
are 16,170 separate product purchases, of which 3,612 are in New Jersey and the remaining 12,558 are in the control states.28 The average consumer price in the sample is $3.61.
Figure 1 plots the distribution of consumer prices, and shows that just under 50 percent
of all purchases were under $3 and roughly 75 percent were under $5.
Below, we investigate how the tax burden differs by income and education. We
divide households into two income groups. To do so, we use the 2006 federal poverty
guidelines (DHHS 2006). First are “low-income” households that have an annual income
of less than 2.5 times the poverty line. Second are “high-income” households that have
an annual income of at least 2.5 time the poverty line. Table 1 shows the average prices
paid by households in these two income groups. Low-income households, which earn on
average $28k per year, pay on average $3.20 for each menstrual hygiene product. Highincome households, which earn on average $80k per year, pay on average $3.89 for each
menstrual hygiene product. We note that we cannot divide households in finer income
groups because of data limitations. Although we would be particularly interested in how
the tampon tax burden is borne by the lowest income consumers, coverage of purchases
of menstrual hygiene products for the lowest income households in Nielsen is limited.

28

To put this into perspective, the 16,170 separate product purchases amounts to roughly 500k units purchased
(i.e., if all products sold were a single tampon there would be 500k individual tampons sold). In other words, the
average product contains roughly 31 units. This counts each product sold as its own product, that is, if someone
buys two of a package it counts as two. We note that a single UPC code may identify a tampon or sanitary napkin
package that contains multiple individual products. Given that we control at the UPC level, such differences in
number of individual units in a product are accounted for.
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Table 2: The Effect of the New Jersey Tampon Tax Repeal on Tax-Inclusive
Consumer Prices
ln(Tax-Inclusive Price)
Sample
Post × Treat
Covariates
State fixed effects
Year-month fixed effects
Household demographics
UPC fixed effects
Observations
R2

All
(1)

Low Income
(2)

High Income
(3)

No College
(4)

College Grad
(5)

−0.0734***
(0.008)

−0.1244***
(0.010)

−0.0394**
(0.012)

−0.1114***
(0.008)

−0.034
(0.017)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
16,170
0.631

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
5,643
0.66

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
10,527
0.632

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
8,226
0.653

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
7,944
0.632

NOTE: Clustered standard errors in parentheses (by state). *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Household demographics include household size, marital status, income, and race. The dependent variable is the natural log of the
tax-inclusive price. The interaction term Post × Treat equals 1 when the product was purchased in New Jersey
(as opposed to the control states) after the tampon tax was repealed, and is the difference-in-differences estimator
given in Equation (1). Each column represents one estimate for the sample identified at the top of the table.

With a handful of states recently repealing tampon taxes, we feel this is an interesting avenue for future research once data become available.
We also divide households into two different education groups. First are households where none of the head of household members have a college degree. Second are
households where at least of one of the head of household members has a college
degree. Table 1 shows the average prices paid by households by education. Households
without a college degree pay on average $3.45 for a menstrual hygiene product, which is
$0.40 lower than the average price of $3.85 for menstrual hygiene products purchased by
households with a college degree. Herein, we will use the term household and consumers
interchangeably.

D. Results
We estimate the specification in Equation (1). Table 2 reports the results. Column
1 reports the main results for the pass through rate among all consumers in the sample.
We find that the pass through rate is −0.073. This means that, relative to tax-inclusive
prices in the control states, tax-inclusive prices in New Jersey decreased by 7.3 percent after
menstrual hygiene products were excluded from the sales tax base, just slightly higher than
the tax of 6.9 percent. Given that the point estimates are close to full pass through and that
the standard error overlaps with full pass through, the results provide evidence that the tax
beneﬁt was roughly fully obtained by consumers.29 Columns 2 and 3 report the tax pass
through rate for low-income and high-income consumers, respectively. Following an

29

Table A1 in the Appendix provides four sets of point estimates that vary by the set of controls used.
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approach that has been used in the literature (Harding et al. 2012), these estimates are from
separate regressions that restrict the sample to those in the indicated group. The estimated
coefﬁcient for low-income consumers is −0.124. The standard errors do not cover −0.069,
meaning that the repeal of the taxes decreased prices for low-income consumers by more
than the size of the tax. The implied tax pass through rate is 1.80 (−0.124/−0.069). The estimated coefﬁcient for high-income consumers is −0.039. The standard errors also do not
cover −0.069, meaning that the repeal of the taxes decreased prices for high-income consumers by less than the size of the tax. The implied tax pass through rate is 0.56 (−0.039/
−0.069). In other words, the tax beneﬁt of the repeal was roughly shared between highincome consumers and the producers of menstrual hygiene products.
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 2 report the tax pass through rates for consumers without and with a college education, respectively. The estimates are again from separate
regressions that restrict the sample to those in the indicated group. Because income and
education are highly correlated, one might expect the differences in the tax pass through
rate between low- and high-income consumers to carry over to consumers with and without a college education. That is indeed what we find, but to a lesser degree. The tax pass
through rate for consumers without a college education is −0.111, but −0.034 for consumers with a college degree.
Under certain assumptions, the tax pass through rates are sufficient statistics for
the tax burden (see, e.g., Weyl & Fabinger 2013). However, an ideal tax incidence analysis characterizes the effect of a tax change on the utility levels of consumers, which also
incorporates any other costs associated with changes in behavior on other margins. We
want to understand the true difference in cost of the products after the tax repeal, which
incorporates any opportunity cost to achieve the prices actually paid. One potentially
important opportunity cost is that associated with consumer price search. For example, if
the cost of consumer price search increased after the tax repeal, the tax pass through
results would overstate the true benefits obtained by consumers.
We investigate the extent that New Jersey consumers respond to the tax repeal by
changing their use of coupons when purchasing menstrual hygiene products. Because
the opportunity cost of using a coupon is likely to be independent of the value of the
coupon, here we focus on whether a coupon was used rather than the value of the coupon. Below, we will ask the separate question of whether changes in coupon use can
explain the differential tax pass through rates by income and education, which incorporates the value of the coupon.
The use of coupons is an equilibrium concept, where the availability of coupons
and the size of the discount offered could respond to the tax repeal. Changes in the availability and size of offered coupons in turn influence not only consumers’ decisions to use
coupons but also retail prices. As a result, we might expect differential coupon responses
by income and education. For example, if low-income consumers purchase different
products than high-income consumers and the availability and size of the offered coupons differ by product type, one might expect coupon use to change differentially by
income. Moreover, if low-income consumers are more or less likely to upgrade to higherquality menstrual hygiene products after the tax repeal and coupons differ by product,
one might expect coupon use to change differentially by income. Finally, manufactures
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Repeal of Tampon Taxes and Coupon Use
Used Coupon in Purchase

Sample
Post × Treat
Covariates
State fixed effects
Year-month fixed effects
Household demographics
UPC fixed effects
Observations
R2
Dependent variable mean

All
(1)

Low Income
(2)

High Income
(3)

No College
(4)

College Grad
(5)

0.002
(0.010)

0.0425**
(0.013)

−0.0305**
(0.009)

0.003
(0.013)

0.008
(0.018)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
16,170
0.181
0.22

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
5,643
0.304
0.21

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
10,527
0.176
0.23

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
8,226
0.237
0.21

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
7,944
0.199
0.23

NOTE: Clustered standard errors in parentheses (by state). *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Household demographics include household size, marital status, income, and race. The dependent variable is an indicator variable
for whether the purchase used a coupon. The interaction term Post × Treat equals 1 when the product was purchased in New Jersey (as opposed to the control states) after the tampon tax was repealed, and is the
difference-in-differences estimator given in Equation (1). Each column represents one estimate for the sample
identified at the top of the table.

might attempt to prevent product substitution of some menstrual hygiene products by
offering larger coupons on the products. Unfortunately, we do not observe the offered
discounts, so cannot shed light on why any differential coupon responses might be
occurring.
Over the sample as a whole, 22 percent of purchases used a coupon. In New Jersey,
27 percent of purchases used a coupon. In the control states, 20 percent of purchases
used a coupon. To assess whether and how coupon use changed after the tax repeal, we
estimate Equation (1), but where the outcome variable takes the value of 0 if no coupon
was used for a purchase and a value of 1 if a coupon was used. The coefficient of interest
is again β, which estimates the effect of the tax repeal on the probability that a purchase
uses a coupon. We estimate the five different specifications seen in Table 2. Table 3
reports the results. We find no evidence that overall coupon use responded to the tax
repeal. However, we find an increase in coupon use for low-income consumers and a
decrease in coupon use for high-income consumers. In particular, whereas coupon use
for high-income women decreased by 4 percent of menstrual hygiene purchases following the tax repeal, coupon use for low-income women increased by 5 percent of menstrual hygiene purchases following the tax repeal. Relative to the baseline rate at which
coupons are used, these are large effects. The differential changes in coupon use by
income suggests that the opportunity cost of consumer price search increased for lowincome consumers but decreased for high-income consumers. This provides evidence
that the tax pass through results overstate the true differential tax benefits from the tax
repeal between these low-income and high-income consumers. These findings are consistent with evidence that cigarette taxes are shifted to prices for consumers who engage in
more price search at lower rates than for consumers who search less (DeCicca et al.
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2013). We find no evidence that coupon use changed between consumers with and without a college degree, but these coefficients are imprecisely estimated.

IV. MECHANISMS
In this section, we explore the extent that the differential tax pass through results by
income and education can be explained by differential between-product and withinproduct pass through.

A. Differential Pass Through by Product
Above, we saw overall price differences between consumers by income and education,
which could reflect both differences in product quality and differences in prices for the
same product. If low-income consumers purchase different types of menstrual hygiene
products than high-income consumers and if there are differences in tax pass through
between menstrual hygiene products, such product differences could contribute to the
differences in tax pass through by income.
To test for differences in pass through between products purchased by highincome and low-income consumers, we estimate the tax pass through rate separately for
each product, and compare the tax pass through rates for the products purchased by
high-income and low-income consumers. Because UPCs make very fine distinctions
between products, we use courser product information in Nielsen at the brand level, for
example, Always Pantyliners, Tampax, and Stayfree Maxi Pads. After excluding product
categories with very few purchases,30 we are left with 37 brands. To account for differences in prices by UPC within a brand, we estimate separate pass through rates for each
brand but use UPC fixed effects. Then, we match these tax pass through rates to each
purchase of New Jersey consumers after the tax repeal and calculate the average tax pass
through rate for each consumer. The consumer’s average tax pass through rate indicates
how much prices decreased on average after the tax repeal using prices in other states as
a control group. By focusing only on purchases after the tax repeal, we hold constant the
product bundle, an issue we will explore next.
We find no evidence that the tax pass through rates between products are different
for New Jersey consumers by income or education. In particular, we find the average tax
pass through rate to be −0.069 for low-income consumers and −0.068 for high-income consumers; we ﬁnd the average tax pass through rate to be −0.076 for consumers without a college degree and −0.063 for consumers with a college degree. The differences in means are
not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels, providing no evidence that the differences
in tax pass through by income and education are explained by differential tax pass through
by product.

30

We include products with at least 50 purchases but the results are not highly sensitive to the cutoff used.
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Next, we relax the constant product bundle assumption and investigate any effects
of product substitution. Theoretical work on tax incidence shows that the tax pass
through rate is a function of supply and demand elasticities (e.g., Weyl & Fabinger
2013), and elasticities incorporate substitution patterns between products. In addition to
shedding light on tax incidence, changes in the types of products purchased has important policy implications because one of the advocated reasons to eliminate tampon taxes
is to make menstrual hygiene products more affordable. We investigate whether consumers respond to the tax repeal by changing the quality of menstrual hygiene products
they purchase. To do so, we construct a quality metric for each product that is the average retail price of the product over the entire sample period. The quality metric is constant for a UPC across time. To construct the UPC-level quality metric for this analysis, we
use data from Nielsen for all states in the United States from 2004 to 2006.
We then consider how this quality metric changes for purchases of consumers in
New Jersey compared to consumers in the control states. We calculate the mean per-unit
price of menstrual hygiene products purchased by a consumer before and after the
change in law. This analysis therefore restricts the sample to consumers who made purchases in the pre- and post-tax change period. The unit of observation is a consumer
pre/post period. We then estimate Equation (1) where the dependent variable is the
quality metric. There are 1,360 observations in the regression. Standard errors are again
clustered at the state level. Because this analysis is restricted to consumers who purchased
menstrual hygiene products before and after the tax repeal, the estimates are based on a
relatively small sample size and therefore should be viewed with some caution. We find
that, relative to consumers in the control states, consumers in New Jersey upgrade the
quality of their product by roughly 3 percent after the tampon tax repeal (by $0.11 from
a baseline average price of $3.55). The point estimate is significant at a p < 0.053 level
(standard error of 0.042). We considered whether low-income consumers change product
quality after the tax repeal differently than high-income consumers (and similarly by education), but found that we do not have the statistical power to say anything. Future
research should explore the change in quality by income or education after tampon taxes
are repealed.
B. Differential Within-Product Pass Through
The differential between-product pass through analysis assumed that tax pass through
was constant within each product. However, there is not a single price for a given product
across the market and between consumers. For example, prices for a given product differ
between stores, and different consumers shop at different stores; sellers can price discriminate by offering different types of discounts and coupons. Taxes could be passed
through to prices of the same product differently across stores. Moreover, taxes could be
passed through to prices of the same product differently across consumers if consumers
respond differently by searching for better prices through shopping at different stores.
Even within a store, taxes could be passed through to prices of the same product differently across consumers if consumers respond differently by using more or less discounts
(e.g., coupons) or if sellers can price discriminate between consumers by offering
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different discounts (e.g., directed mail). Differential pass through within product could
contribute to difference in tax pass through by income and education.
To test for whether there is differential pass through within given products, we
assess whether product-level changes in prices in New Jersey from before to after the tax
change are different for low-income and high-income consumers. To do so, we calculate
(1) the change in prices in New Jersey of a brand purchased by high-income consumers
from before to after the tax change, and (2) the change in prices in New Jersey of the
same brand purchased by low-income consumers from before to after the tax change.
For any given brand, the difference between (2) and (1) indicates how much more the
price changed for low-income consumers than for high-income consumers. A difference
of zero indicates that brand-level prices changed by the same amount for low- and highincome consumers in New Jersey. A nonzero finding would provide evidence that differential within-product pass through explains part of the differential pass through by
income.
We find that prices of a brand decrease on average by $0.057 more for low-income
consumers than for high-income consumers. Relative to the average price in New Jersey
before the tax repeal ($3.47), the findings suggest that 0.017 percentage points of the
gap between the tax pass through rates by income is driven by differences in withinproduct pass through. To put this in perspective, note that the gap in the tax pass
through rates between low- and high-income consumers is 0.085 (the difference between
−0.124 for low-income consumers and −0.039 for high-income consumers; see Table 2). The
evidence therefore suggests that differential within-product pass through explains one-ﬁfth of
the differences in pass through by income (0.018/0.085). We repeat this exercise by education
and ﬁnd that differential within-product pass through explains 0.031 percentage points of
the 0.077 gap between tax pass through for college and non-college consumers.
We next assess the extent that changes in coupon use are driving the differential
tax pass through rates by income. Coupon usage is related to consumer price search, but
it is not exactly equivalent to price search because it is likely driven both by consumers
seeking out coupons and by producers offering more or better coupons. Over the sample
as a whole, coupons lowered the price of purchases by an average of $0.33. For the 22 percent of purchases made that used a coupon, the average coupon decreased posted prices
by just over 40 percent. Figure A1 in the Appendix reports the distribution of coupon
values. Most coupons are priced in a discrete space, where over half of all coupons used
are exactly $0.5, $1, $2, or $3.
We estimate Equation (1) but where the outcome is the offered, pre-coupon retail
price, where the sales tax is applied to the offered price. In doing so, we invoke the unrealistic assumption that offered retail prices would not respond to the elimination of coupons and apply the relevant state sales tax rate to the offered retail price. This implies
that the results here are purely descriptive. That is, this is a counterfactual analysis where
we assume that retail prices would not adjust if coupons were no longer available. This is
similar to the “static” assumption used in empirical studies of tax expenditures (e.g., Cole
et al. 2011). Table 4 reports the results. Although above we find no evidence of an overall
response in the use of coupons (see Table 3), the value of discounts used could have
changed. Overall and for each subgroup, we find that taxes are undershifted to these
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Table 4: The Effect of the New Jersey Tampon Tax Repeal on Counterfactual
Tax-Inclusive Posted Prices
ln(Counterfactual Tax-Inclusive Offered Price)
Sample
Post × Treat
Covariates
State fixed effects
Year-month fixed effects
Household demographics
UPC fixed effects
Observations
R2

All
(1)

Low Income
(2)

High Income
(3)

No College
(4)

College Grad
(5)

−0.0536***
(0.004)

−0.0456***
(0.005)

−0.0546***
(0.005)

−0.0606***
(0.002)

−0.0486**
(0.011)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
16,170
0.904

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
5,643
0.916

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
10,527
0.904

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
8,226
0.914

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
7,944
0.911

NOTE: Clustered standard errors in parentheses (by state). *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Household demographics include household size, marital status, income, and race. The dependent variable is the natural log of the
counterfactual tax-inclusive offered price. The interaction term Post × Treat equals 1 when the product was purchased in New Jersey (as opposed to the control states) after the tampon tax was repealed, and is the
difference-in-differences estimator given in Equation (1). Each column represents one estimate for the sample
identified at the top of the table.

counterfactual prices. The tax pass through rate for the entire sample is −0.053. The standard errors for all but Column 5 do not encompass −0.069 at conventional levels, providing
evidence that the taxes were not fully shifted to these counterfactual prices. These results
provide some evidence that the tax pass through estimates are in part driven by changes in
coupons.

V. CONCLUSION
This article investigated the economic incidence of the 2005 elimination of menstrual
hygiene products from the sales tax base in New Jersey. We found that the tax break is
fully shifted to consumers, but that the tax break was not distributed equally. We found
that the tax break was overshifted to prices for low-income consumers and consumers
without a college degree but undershifted to prices for high-income consumers and consumers with a college degree. However, we also found that coupon use increased for lowincome consumers after the repeal but decreased for high-income consumers, suggesting
that the differential tax pass through by income overstated the true differences in tax
benefits from the tax repeal by income.
The findings have implications for state policymakers. As of this writing, 17 states
have pending legislation to repeal tampon taxes. Although understanding the economic
incidence of tampon tax repeals will be important for state policymakers, we do not
downplay the importance of the expressive value of repealing tampon taxes: even if the
economic benefits of the tax repeal were not borne by consumers, repealing tampon
taxes could promote women’s health and gender equality by changing attitudes and
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removing stigmas (McAdams 2015). The symbolism of the tax may itself partly be the
goal of advocates for a tampon tax repeal (e.g., Alstott 1996).
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX FOR STATE STATUTES
In 2016, 12 states and the District of Columbia considered proposals to exempt menstrual hygiene products from the sales tax base.31 Three states—Connecticut, Illinois, and
New York—and DC adopted the proposals. These states joined 10 other states that did
not tax menstrual hygiene products before 2016. Five states—Alaska, Delaware, New
Hampshire, Montana, and Oregon—do not have sales tax. Five states specifically exempt
menstrual hygiene products—Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. In Maryland and Massachusetts, menstrual hygiene products are exempt because
they are considered medical products.32 Other states just explicitly exempt such products,
including Pennsylvania.33 The statutory language includes most menstrual hygiene
products.

31

These states are California, see A.B. 1561 Sales and use taxes: exemption: sanitary napkins: tampons: menstrual
sponges
and
menstrual
cups
(2016),
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=
201520160AB1561; Connecticut, see S.B. 502 (2016), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2016/ACT/pa/2016PA-00003-R00SB00502SS1-PA.htm; Illinois, see S.B. 2746 (2016), Use/Occ Tx-Feminine Hygiene; Michigan, see H.B. 5234 (2016),
http://legislature.mi.gov/doc.aspx?2016-HB-5234, Mississippi, see S.B. 2053 (2016), https://legiscan.com/MS/bill/
SB2053/2016; New York, see S.B. 7838 (2016), http://legislation.nysenate.gov/pdf/bills/2015/S7838; Ohio, see
H.B. 272, Exempts feminine hygiene products from sales tax (2016), https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/
legislation-summary?id=GA131-HB-272; Rhode Island, see H.B. 5377, Relating to Taxation—Sales and Use Taxes—
Liability and Computation (2016), http://webserver.rilin.state.ri.us/BillText/BillText17/HouseText17/H5377.pdf;
Tennessee, see H.B. 2059, Taxes, Sales (2016), https://legiscan.com/TN/bill/HB2059/2015; Utah, see
H.B. 202 Hygiene Tax Act (2016), https://le.utah.gov/~2016/bills/static/HB0202.html; Virginia, see H.B. 952 Retail
Sales and Use Tax; exemption for tampons and sanitary napkins (2016), https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?
161+sum+HB952; and Wisconsin, A.B. 949, An Act to create 77.54 (63) of the statutes; Relating to: a sales and use tax
exemption for feminine hygiene products (2016), http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2015/proposals/ab949. Id. The District of Columbia proposed a similar exclusion as well. See B. 21-0696—Feminine Hygiene and Diapers Sales Tax
Exemption Amendment Act of 2016, http://lims.dccouncil.us/Legislation/B21-0696?FromSearchResults=true.

32

Comptroller of Md, Taxability of Medical Equipment, Bulletin 01-1, Mar. 2001, http://taxes.marylandtaxes.com/
Resource_Library/.Tax_Publications/Tax_Bulletins/Sales_and_Use_Tax_Bulletins/su_bul01-1.pdf; Mass. Dep’t of
Rev., “A Guide to Sales and Use Tax,” http://www.mass.gov/dor/individuals/taxpayer-help-and-resources/taxguides/salesuse-tax-guide.html#home.

33

Penn. Code, P.L. 97 No. 22 § 9.2(4).
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In 2017, 15 states—Arizona,34 California,35 Colorado,36 Florida,37 Louisiana,38
Maine,39 Michigan,40 Missouri,41 Ohio,42 Rhode Island,43 Tennessee,44 Texas,45 Utah,46
Vermont,47 and Virginia48—introduced legislation targeting the tampon tax, with Florida
subsequently passing its tampon tax exemption. Bills have even been introduced at the
federal level to provide a refundable tax credit for low-income women for menstrual
hygiene product purchases.49 The goals of this legislation are similar to those of the tampon tax repeal efforts.
APPENDIX: CROSS-BORDER SHOPPING
There is a concern that changes in cross-border shopping could bias the results. The
main concern is that New Jersey consumers who previously purchased menstrual hygiene
products in a different state because of the New Jersey sales tax on menstrual hygiene
products respond to tax repeal by purchasing menstrual hygiene products in New Jersey.

34

H.B. 2418, 53d Leg., 1st Sess. (Ariz. 2017).

35

A.B. 9, 2017-18 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).

36

H.B. 17-1127, 2017 Reg. Sess. (Col. 2017).

37

H.B. 7109, 2017 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2017).

38

S.B. 24, 2017 Reg. Sess. (La. 2017).

39

L.D. 206, 128th Leg., 1st Sess. (Me. 2017).

40

H.B. 4129, 2017-18 Leg. Sess. (Mich. 2017).

41

H.B. 841, 2017-18 Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2017).

42

H.B. 61, 132d G.A. (Ohio 2017).

43

H. 5377, 2017 Leg. Sess. (R.I. 2017).

44

H.B. 804, 110th G.A. (Tenn. 2017).

45

H.B. 716, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017).

46

H.B. 171, 2017 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2017).

47

H.B. 43, 2017-18 G.A. (Vt. 2017).

48

H.B. 1593, 2017 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2017).

49

Fund Essential Menstruation Products Act of 2015, H.R. 3117, 114th Cong. (2015); Menstrual Products Tax
Credit Act of 2016, H.R. 5917, 114th Cong. (2016); Menstrual Products for Employees Act of 2016, H.R. 5915,
114th Cong. (2016).
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Sensitivity of Tax Pass Through Rate with Respect to the Controls
ln(Tax Inclusive Price)

Sample
Post × Treat
Covariates
State fixed effects
Year-month fixed effects
Household demographics
UPC fixed effects
State time trends
Observations
R2

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

−0.112**
(0.025)

−0.124***
(0.018)

−0.073***
(0.008)

−0.055**
(0.014)

Yes
Yes
No
No
No
16,170
0.023

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
16,170
0.07

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
16,170
0.631

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
16,170
0.631

NOTE: Clustered standard errors in parentheses (by state). *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Household demographics include household size, marital status, income, and race. The dependent variable is the natural log of the
tax-inclusive price. The interaction term Post × Treat equals 1 when the product was purchased in New Jersey
(as opposed to the control states) after the tampon tax was repealed, and is the difference-in-differences estimator
given in Equation (1). Each column represents one estimate for the set of controls indicated in the middle of the
table.

We assess the potential bias in a number of ways. First, we use information on the zip
code of the store where the product was purchased to investigate whether cross-border
shopping in New Jersey changed after the tax change. In New Jersey, over the entire

Figure A1:

Distribution of coupon value.

NOTE: Excludes the 2.7 percent of coupons above $5.
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Table A2:

Sensitivity of Tax Pass Through Rate with Respect to Cross-Border Shopping
ln(Tax Inclusive Price)

Post × Treat
Covariates
State fixed effects
Year-month fixed effects
Household demographics
UPC fixed effects
Observations
R2

(1)

(2)

(3)

−0.073**
(0.018)

−0.078***
(0.010)

−0.071***
(0.009)

Yes
Yes
No
No
15,442
0.637

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
7,532
0.631

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
19,661
0.638

NOTE: Clustered standard errors in parentheses (by state). *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Household demographics include household size, marital status, income, and race. The dependent variable is the natural log of the
tax-inclusive price. The interaction term Post × Treat equals 1 if the product was purchased in New Jersey
(as opposed to the control states) after the tampon tax was repealed, and is the difference-in-differences estimator
given in Equation (1).

sample, only 0.55 percent of menstrual hygiene products were purchased in a different
state. Before the tax change, 0.53 percent of menstrual hygiene products were purchased
in another state. After the tax change, 0.60 percent of menstrual hygiene products were
purchased in another state. This 0.07 percentage point increase in cross-border shopping
is not statistically significant (p < 0.36).
Second, we restrict the sample to purchases made in the consumer’s state of residence and reestimate the main specification.50 We find no evidence that the tax pass
through rates change down to the third digit, which is unsurprising because only 0.5 percent of purchases are dropped.
Third, we use data on the zip codes bordering another state and the particular
state it borders and reestimate the tax pass through rate after excluding from the sample
(1) consumers living in New Jersey in zip codes bordering another state, and (2) consumers living in a zip code that borders New Jersey.51 The results are reported in Column
1 of Table A2.
Fourth, we restrict the control group to states not bordering New Jersey. In Column 2 of Table A2, we restrict the control group in the main sample of the article to
the two states that do not border New Jersey (Maryland and Connecticut). In Column
3, we expand the control group by adding other surrounding states that do not border New Jersey. In particular, we added Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and North Carolina. Note that both Ohio and Virginia changed sales tax rates between 2004 and

50

Note that we treat missing store zip codes as being purchased within New Jersey. However, if we drop missing
observations from the sample, the results are very similar.

51

These data are from the replication materials in Agarwal et al. (2017).
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2006 so we do not include them as an additional control group for this robustness
check.
Table A2 provides no evidence that the tax pass through rates change with these
different samples in a statistical sense. In sum, we find no evidence that spillovers bias
the results.

